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LIMITING PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS UNDER
THE HOBBS ACT: WILL UNITED STATES v. EVANS
BE THE NEXT McNALLY?
DAN

K.

WEBB, STEVEN

I.

F.

MOLO, AND JAMES

F.

HURST*

INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years the two weapons used most frequently by
federal prosecutors in their war against local public corruption, in the
Seventh Circuit and elsewhere, have been the mail fraud statute' and the
Hobbs Act. 2 The courts have allowed these two statutes to be stretched
and molded to extend federal jurisdiction over what historically had been
considered purely state and local crimes. In its 1987 decision in McNally
v. United States,3 the Supreme Court, following a strict interpretive approach, held that prosecutors and the lower courts had gone too far in
applying the mail fraud statute and limited the statute's jurisdictional
reach. 4 In granting a writ of certiorari in the case of United States v.
Evans,5 the Court appears poised to limit the Hobbs Act similarly.
The Hobbs Act prohibits interference with interstate commerce by
means of "extortion" and "robbery;" it does not refer to bribery. Under
the Act, extortion is defined as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
* Messrs. Webb and Molo are partners and Mr. Hurst is an associate with the firm of Winston & Strawn in Chicago. The authors acknowledge the assistance of Professor G. Robert Blakey
of the University of Notre Dame Law School who served as a sounding board through the development of some of the thoughts contained in this article. We also wish to thank Professor Adam
Harris Kurland of the Howard University School of Law for his observations, insights, and patience.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988); see generally Charles F.C. Ruff, FederalProsecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1172 (1977);
James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to
the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 815 (1988) [hereinafter "Lindgren"]; Herbert J. Stem, Prosecutions of Local PoliticalCorruption Under the HobbsAct: the Unnecessary DistinctionBetween Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter "Stern"].
3. 483 U.S. 350 (1987); see also infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 358-61.
5. 910 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 2256 (1991). According to the
petitioner's brief, the question presented in Evans is "whether ...an affirmative act of inducement by
a public official such as a demand has to be shown by the government in an extortion case under
color of official right?" Brief for Petitioner at 4, Evans v. United States, (No. 90-6015). Evans
involves a federal prosecution in connection with a government sting operation in Atlanta, Georgia.
910 F.2d at 792-94. The defendant was a member of the Board of Commissioners in DeKalb County
accused of accepting payments from an FBI agent for assistance in zoning matters. Id.
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violence or fear, or under color of official right."' 6 To extend the Hobbs
Act's reach to bribery, then, the question is when does bribery constitute
extortion under this definition? According to eight of the ten courts of
appeals to address the question, the answer is always; extortion "under
color of official right" fully embraces bribery. 7 In other words, bribery is
extortion whether or not the payment has been induced by the defendant.
Although widely accepted, this view is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Hobbs Act and the prevailing judicial definition of
extortion at the time of enactment. A review of the Act's legislative history and early twentieth century American case law reveals that Congress did not intend that the Hobbs Act proscribe classic bribery-the
passive acceptance of a corrupt payment. The courts created the Hobbs
Act prohibition against bribery. The Supreme Court should correct the
courts' flawed interpretation of the Act when it resolves this issue in
Evans.
This article is divided into six sections. Section II traces the evolution of the Hobbs Act from its inception in 1946 through today, focusing
on the expansion of the Act's reach from traditional extortion to the passive receipt of bribes.8 Section III outlines the interpretation of the
Hobbs Act advanced by the majority of the Courts of Appeals including
the Seventh Circuit, 9 and Section IV outlines the alternate interpretation
advanced by the Second and Ninth Circuits.10 Section V, divided into
three subsections, explains why the Second and Ninth Circuit view is
correct. First, contrary to the view of some courts, the language of the
Hobbs Act does not settle the issue because it is ambiguous." Second,
while the legislative history of the Hobbs Act does not specifically address the issue, the Act mandates that official extortion be defined according to its meaning in 1946-not its meaning under ancient English
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
7. United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d 873, 875 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1070 (1984);
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 594-96 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d
123, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411,
417-18 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1421-22
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1988); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1074-75
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320-21 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976); Evans, 910 F.2d at 796-97. Contra, United States v. O'Grady, 742
F.2d 682 (2d. Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
discussed at infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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common law.' 2 Third, according to the prevailing definition of official
extortion in 1946, the passive receipt of a bribe by a public official did not
constitute extortion. Consequently, applying that definition to the Hobbs
Act, the Act plainly does not proscribe passive bribery. 13 Section VI criticizes the incomplete and misleading review of the 1946 case law performed by those advocating an expansive view of the Hobbs Act.'4
Finally, comparing this issue to the issue faced by the Supreme Court in
McNally, Section VII concludes that the Rule of Lenity ultimately controls the question. Thus, if the case law existing in 1946 is not enough,
the Rule of Lenity conclusively mandates that the Hobbs Act not be read
to proscribe the passive receipt of bribes.' 5
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE HOBBS ACT

Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in its present form in 1946,16 and
the corrupt practice of bribing state and local officials existed well before
that. But no federal court held that the Hobbs Act proscribed passive
bribery until 1972.1 7 During the 24 years from 1946 to 1972, the few
courts that considered the question relied on the traditional distinction
between extortion and bribery to reject the Act's application to bribery.1 8
This changed, however, in 1972 with the Third Circuit's decision in
United States v. Kenny.' 9 In affirming the Hobbs Act conviction of several local and county officials in New Jersey, the court construed the
Act's extortion definition broadly, stating: "[t]he 'under color of official
right' language plainly is disjunctive. That part of the definition repeats
the common law definition of extortion, a crime which could only be
committed by a public official, and which did not require proof of threat,
'20
fear, or duress."

12. See infra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 70-104 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948).
17. See infro notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
18. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 833 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The distinction from bribery is
therefore . . . the fear and lack of voluntariness on the part of the victim"), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1058 (1972); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir. 1971) ("while the essence of
bribery is voluntariness, the essence of extortion is duress"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972);
United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (same).
19. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
20. Id. at 1229. The court then cited four post-Hobbs Act cases in support of the notion that
under common law there was no requirement of duress or coercion for official extortion: United
States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969); United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir.
1947); State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 167 A.2d 161 (1961), overruled on other grounds, State v. Savoie,
67 N.J. 439, 341 A.2d 598 (1975); State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 371, 91 A.2d 751, 759-60 (1952),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 341 A.2d 598 (1975).
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With no more stated analysis than that, a significant expansion of
federal jurisdiction had begun. Although not quite explicitly, the Kenny
court held in effect that the mere passive acceptance of a bribe could
constitute "extortion" under the Hobbs Act. Kenny thus provided the
springboard for a significant expansion of federal jurisdiction to a matter
traditionally left to the states-the acceptance of bribes by state and local
officials. In just four years, six other circuits substantially adopted the
Kenny view, and the Hobbs Act became a potent weapon in the federal
government's war against local public corruption. 2' Recently, two courts
of appeals rejected the broad application of the Act to bribery, 22 but the
Kenny view remains the majority.
III.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT VIEW

Two years after Kenny, in 1974, the Seventh Circuit became the first
court to follow Kenny's lead in United States v. Braasch.23 Braasch concerned the prosecution of several Chicago police officers for shaking
down liquor store and tavern owners for payments to ensure police "protection." '2 4 Affirming the convictions, the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta:
[i]t
matters not whether the public official induces payments to perform his duties or not to perform his duties ....
So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls
within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. That such conduct25may also
constitute "classic bribery" is not a relevant consideration.
Despite commentator criticism of this view, and the contrary view of two
other Courts of Appeals considering the question en banc, 26 the Seventh
Circuit has held firm over the past two decades.
The court has reiterated many times that "[e]xtortion under 'color
of official right' equals the knowing receipt of bribes; they need not be
solicited" or induced in any manner by the public official. 27 In United
21. See United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819
(1976); United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971
(1976); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Braasch, 505
F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d
364, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320-21 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 919 (1976).
22. See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc); United States v.
Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc); discussed infra at notes 31-39 and accompanying
text.
23. 505 F.2d at 139. One of the authors, Mr. Webb, served as lead prosecutor for the government in the Braasch prosecution. Mr. Webb also served as the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Illinois from 1981 to 1984.
24. Id. at 142.
25. Id. at 151.
26. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
27. United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d at 1404, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
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States v. Holzer,28 the court explained fully that "[i]n this circuit it is
extortion if the official knows that the bribe, gift, or other favor is motivated by a hope that it will influence him in the exercise of his office and
'29
if, knowing this, he accepts the bribe."

The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that other circuits differ on
this question, but has never explained its disagreement with those circuits. Perhaps it has not yet confronted the issue squarely. As Judge
Posner stated in Holzer, "[t]here is an air of the academic about this
intercircuit conflict because, as a matter of fact, in none of the cases in
which the issue has been pressed was the official passive .... "30 Apparently no Seventh Circuit case since Holzer has made the issue any less
academic in the court's eyes.
IV.

THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUIT VIEW

The Second and Ninth Circuits, each sitting en banc, have definitively rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach. The leading Second Circuit case is United States v. O'Grady;31 the leading Ninth Circuit case is
United States v. Aguon. 32 In O'Grady,the Second Circuit reversed a conviction because the jury was instructed that "[t]he Government need not
show that the defendant in words or otherwise, induced, requested, demanded, or solicited the benefits ....,,33 The court explained:
[t]he conduct proscribed by the Hobbs Act is the wrongful use of public office, not merely acceptance of benefits. Although receipt of benefits by a public official is a necessary element of the crime, there must
under color of his
also be proof that the public official did something,
34
public office, to cause the giving of benefits.

Thus, the court concluded:
[t]o prove the crime of extortion under color of public office the government must show that the public official induced the benefits received. The fact of public office supplies the potential threat or force
necessary, but it is the wrongful use of that office to induce benefits
that constitutes the crime ....35 [E]xtortion under color of official right
1035 (1988) (quoting United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.), vacated and remandedon
other grounds, 484 U.S. 807 (1987)); see also United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1530 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986); United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 134 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 1979).
28. 816 F.2d at 304.
29. Id. at 311.
30. Id.
31. 742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc).

32. 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
33. O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 686 (quoting trial transcript).
34. Id. at 687.

35. Id. at 688 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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begins with the public official, not with the gratuitous actions of
another.36

The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in Aguon. There, the
district court instructed the jury that extortion under color of official
right "does not require proof of any specific acts on the part of the public
official demonstrating force, threats, use of fear or inducement. ' 37 Reversing a conviction, the Ninth Circuit explained that Congress "intended to require inducement as an element for conviction under the
Hobbs Act ' 38 and did not intend to ensnare those who had no "more
39
than an inert role in the transaction" at issue.
V.

THE LOGIC OF THE INDUCEMENT REQUIREMENT

The Second and Ninth Circuit view is the better-supported approach; it is consistent with the language of the Hobbs Act and mandated by the Act's legislative history and the predominant judicial
understanding of extortion in 1946. Consequently, this view should prevail in the intercircuit conflict about the meaning of extortion.
A.

Language of the Hobbs Act's Extortion Definition

Every issue of statutory interpretation begins with the language of
the statute, which the courts must construe according to its plain meaning. 40 Here, though, it is clear that there is no plain meaning of the
Hobbs Act extortion definition. In an attempt to divine such a meaning,
many commentators and courts have engaged in a fruitless wrangle over
proper grammatical construction, resorting to an analysis of the often
subtle rules of coordinating conjunctions and parallel prepositions. 4'
The commentators and courts incorrectly presume that Congress followed such rules when drafting the Hobbs Act. Without evidence, that
presumption is little more than a baseless fiction. While helpful in some
cases to discern the "plain meaning" of a statute and congressional intent, reference to standard rules of English does not help here-not when
so many courts and commentators have disagreed on the proper
36. Id. at 691.
37. Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1161 (emphasis removed).
38. Id. at 1165.
39. Id. at 1163.
40. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917).
41. See, e.g., Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1162-63; United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 (lst.
Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. McClelland, 731 F.2d 1438, 1439-40 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010 (1985), rev'd, 941 F.2d 999 (1991); United States v. Kenny,
462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); James P. Fleissner, Comment, Prosecuting
Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: Inducement as an Element of Extortion Under Color of Official
Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066, 1078-79 (1985); Stem, supra note 2, at 14.
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Instead, such heated debate over construction of the Hobbs Act
leads to one inescapable conclusion: the Act's language is ambiguous. It
can reasonably be read one of two ways: either (1) "the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, .

.

. under color of official

right;" or (2) "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent,
induced ... under color of official right."'4 3 The correct constructionwith or without the word "induced"-is not at all clear from the face of
the Act. Depending on the words emphasized when reading the Hobbs
Act, either definition appears correct.
B. Legislative History/CongressionalIntent
1. The Text of the Debates
When a plain reading of the statute does not resolve an ambiguity,
the next step is to review the statute's legislative history. Unfortunately,
the legislative history of the Hobbs Act does not offer definitive guidance.
Congress passed the Act in 1946 primarily in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Local 807, InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters." In Local 807, the Court ruled that the extortion prohibition of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 did not proscribe traditional
acts of extortion committed by labor union members who claimed they
were seeking "wages."' 4 5 As the legislative history to the Hobbs Act
makes plain, Congress' primary concern was to overturn the rule established by Local 807 and to criminalize robbery and extortion by labor
unions. 46 Thus, the congressional debate dealt almost exclusively with
the "threatened force, violence or fear" branch of the Hobbs Act and its
potential effect on the labor movement. The debate included little discus42. See, e.g., Aguon, 851 F.2d at 1162-63 ("induced" modifies "under color of official right");
Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 393 ("induced" does not modify "under color of official right"); McClelland,
731 F.2d at 1440 (does not modify); Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229 (does not modify); Comment, supra
note 41, at 1078-79 (modifies); Stern, supra note 2, at 14 (does not modify).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis supplied).
44. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
45. The respondents, New York labor union members, had waited regularly for trucks operated
by out-of-state drivers coming into New York from New Jersey and then "forced their way onto the
trucks, and by beating or threats of beating the drivers procured payments to themselves . . . [in
amounts] equivalent [to] the union wage scale for a day's work." Id. at 539 (Stone, C.J., dissenting);
see also id. at 525-27. Sometimes the respondents would then drive the truck to its destination,
unload the truck, reload the truck with merchandise for the return trip, and then return it to the outof-state driver. Id. at 526. Other times the respondents did not do any work for the money that was
paid. Id. The Court found that this did not constitute extortion due to the exception under the 1934
Act for "wages paid ... to a bona fide employee." Id. at 531-35. The Court reasoned that the
teamsters were seeking wages. Id.
46. See generally 91 CONG. REC. 11,839-47, 11,900-22 (1945).
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sion of the "under color of official right" branch of the Act and no mean47
ingful attempt to define the term.
Congress offered some guidance, however, when it expressed its intent to rely on the judicial definition of extortion generally understood in
the various states. In an exchange between Congressmen Springer and
Robsion, Robsion asked, "[c]annot the gentleman state that the definition of robbery and extortion put in this bill is that followed by the codes
and statutes generally throughout the Nation, in all the jurisdictions of
the various States?"' 48 Springer replied, "[t]he gentleman is precisely correct. It is practically the same as the statutes in the different States of the
Union."'4 9 Congressman Russell concurred: "[w]herever jurisprudence
has had its sway robbery and extortion have been defined. There is no
use defining those terms because they are so well defined that their definition now is a matter of common knowledge." 50 Congressman Hobbs added that extortion and robbery "have been construed a thousand times
by the courts. Everybody knows what they mean." 5'
On the other hand, some congressmen indicated that the language of
the extortion definition was taken directly from New York's criminal
47. However, Congressmen Hobbs and Sumners made as least some attempt by defining the
crime as something in the nature of false pretenses. Congressman Hobbs explained that "'[c]olor of
official right' means absence of right but pretended assertion of right" and applied to situations such
as: "you pretend to be a police officer, you pretend to be deputy sheriff, but you are not." 89 CONG.
REC. 3,229 (1943). He later confirmed that "[i]t could not possibly apply if there was any bona fide
right; it applies only to pretended right." Id. Congressman Sumners concurred, stating that a careful review of the language revealed that it "means money acquired by somebody claiming to be a
public officer." Id.
Every commentator and court that has focused on this discussion has brushed it aside as the
muddled rambling of two congressmen ignorant of the law. Congressmen Hobbs and Sumners'
explanation could not be correct, they say, because extortion "under color of official right" has never
been defined as they suggest. See Stem, supra note 2, at 12-15; Lindgren, supra note 2, at 890-91;
United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980) ("The brief
debate that occurred in 1943, however, was not clear enough to be determinative of the scope of the
'color of official right' language, especially in light of the confusing reference to false pretense type
crimes, which would seem out of place in an extortion statute."). But giving such short shrift to the
explanations of these two Congressmen during the legislative debate is like ignoring an abstract
expressionist's explanation of his canvas with a black stripe painted down one side and a white stripe
down the other. It is simply contrary to the recognized rules of statutory construction. After all, it
is the intent of Congress that is paramount, not what later commentators and courts believe would
be a more accurate interpretation of the law. Indeed, it is hard to understand how the Congressmen
could have been wrong about the law when they were in fact creating the law. Further, it appears
that their understanding is corroborated by the text of the Act: "under color of official right." Nevertheless, at this late stage, it may be too much to hope that the Supreme Court would rely on Hobbs
and Sumners when the congressmen have been wholly ignored for so long and by so many.
48. 91 CONG. REC. 11,910 (1945).
49. Id.; see also id. (Rep. Springer) ("Robbery is defined by every State in the Union by the
State Legislature.").
50. Id. at 11,914.
51. Id. at 11,912.
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statute, the Penal Code of 1909.52 For instance, Congressman Hobbs

stated later: "there is nothing clearer than the definitions of robbery and
extortion in this bill. They have been construed by the courts not once,
but a thousand times. The definitions in this bill are copied from the
New York Code substantially. '5 3 Congressman Robsion also explained,
"[t]he definitions of robbery and extortion set out in the bill are the same
definitions set out in the New York State code of laws and are defined in
' 54
substantially the same way by the laws of every State in the Union."
Apparently relying on these statements and ignoring the statements of
Congressmen Russell and Springer, a number of courts and commentators have concluded that Congress intended to look specifically to New
York law for the meaning of extortion. This conclusion is unfounded.
Whether or not the Hobbs Act drafters used the language of the New
York extortion definition, no congressman asserted an intent to rely specifically on New York decisional law. 55
Moreover, notwithstanding the assertions of Congressmen Hobbs
and Robsion, whether the Hobbs Act extortion definition was in fact
taken from the New York statute is questionable. Although similar, the
Hobbs Act definition is not identical to the definition in the New York
Penal Code of 1909.56 The definition more closely parallels the extortion
definition contained in the FIELD CODE-the proposed New York criminal code of 1865-which was the model 19th century American criminal
code. 57 While the FIELD CODE eventually served as the basis of New
York's criminal statute, some states actually adopted it before New
York. 58 By the time Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in 1946, many
states had already adopted the FIELD CODE extortion definition. Most
52. See infra note 56.
53. Supra note 48, at 11,900; see also id. (Rep. Hancock) ("bill contains definitions of robbery
and extortion which follow the definitions contained in the laws of the State of New York. * * *
The courts of the States of this country have tried thousands of cases of robbery and extortion. They
know what those crimes are.").
54. Id. at 11,906.
55. See United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 304 (6th Cir. 1977) (concluding that Congress
did not intend to rely specifically upon New York decisional law), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978);
Lindgren, supra note 2, at 900 ("nothing in the Congressional debates indicates an intent to enact
New York case law"); Stem, supra note 2, at 3 (same conclusion).
56. The Penal Code of 1909 provided: "Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, or
the obtaining of property of a corporation from an officer, agent or employer thereof, with [his]
consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right." N.Y. PENAL
LAW of 1909 § 850, as amended, LAWS of 1917, ch. 518.
57.

COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, [PROPOSED] PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

§ 613 (1865) (generally referred to as the "FIELD CODE") ("Extortion is the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official
right."); see also Lindgren, supra note 2, at 892.
58. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 518-24 (West 1988) (enacted in 1872).
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states actually followed the definition more faithfully than New York. 59
Additionally, one commentator notes that references during the
congressional debates to the similarity of the New York statute do not
indicate that Congress looked specifically to New York law for guidance. 6° Instead, the references were probably intended only to quiet the
fears of certain congressmen from New York considered "the leaders of
the fight against [the] Act."' 6 1 The commentator explains that "[i]t was
not surprising .

.

. that [the Act's] advocates, in explaining the Act's

provisions, compared it to the existing law of New York, in an attempt to
show [the opposition leaders from New York] that nothing revolutionary
'62
was proposed."
Thus, considering the unequivocal statements by Congressmen Russell and Springer, it is clear that Congress did not intend to look solely to
New York law for guidance. Rather, as it declared expressly, Congress
intended to rely on the meaning of extortion "under color of official
right" generally understood in the various states.
2.

The Erroneous Consideration of English Common Law

Those courts and commentators advocating an expansive view of
the Hobbs Act argue that, unlike all other varieties of extortion, extortion under color of official right does not require a showing of any kind of
duress, coercion, or inducement. For this conclusion, they rely on English common law where, as Blackstone defined it, extortion was "an
abuse of public justice, which consists in any officer's unlawfully taking,
by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is
not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due."' 63 Under a
broad interpretation of this definition, bribery would fall within the scope
of extortion. Indeed, one expansionist, Professor James Lindgren, has
compiled a significant number of primarily English cases from the 1200s
to 1800s suggesting that, during that period, classic bribery was often
59.

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 621.14 (1949); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 518-24 (West 1988); OKLA.

STAT. ch. 23, § 2682 (1910); see also Lindgren, supra note 2, at 892 (discussing this subject).
60. Stern, supra note 2, at 3; see also 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (Rep. Hobbs) ("The defini-

tions in this bill are copied from the New York Code substantially. So there cannot be any serious
question ... by the gentlemen from New York who are the leaders of the fight against the bill.").
61. Stem, supra note 2, at 3.
62. Id.
63.

4

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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(1769).

However, bribery does not fit quite so neatly in the definition of official extortion advanced by other
leading authorities of the time. Hawkins states that "extortion signifies, in a large sense, any oppression under colour of right; but, that in a strict sense, it signifies the taking of money by any officer, by
colour of his office, either when none at all is due, or not so much is due, or where it is not yet due."
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 316 (6th ed. 1788) (emphasis
added).
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prosecuted as extortion under color of office. 64
65
This analysis, however, is beside the point. As indicated above,
Congress never expressed an intent to rely on a definition of extortion
developed in ancient English common law. Congress enacted the Hobbs
Act in 1946, asserting in the clearest terms that the Act included the
contemporary meaning of extortion. Several times during the debates,
various Congressmen stated, in essence, that "the definition of robbery
and extortion put in this bill is that followed by the codes and statutes
generally throughout the Nation,"' 66 and that those definitions were consistent with the "laws of every State in the Union."' 67 Consequently, the
English common-law meaning of official extortion must be rejected in
favor of the understanding of the crime prevailing in the United States in
1946.68 Under these circumstances, Congress presumably was knowl69
edgeable about existing case law as it related to that understanding.
64. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 837-89. However, the issue does not appear to be as clear as
Professor Lindgren suggests. See JOHN THOMAs NOONAN, BRIBES 584-91 (1984) (arriving at contrary conclusion). None of the cases upon which he relies directly confronts the issue of whether
coercion, duress, demand, or inducement is an element of official extortion. But see Mayor of Lynn's
Case, ILeonard 295, 74 Eng. Rep. 269 (1586). The very few cases from that era that do appear to
make reference to the issue, indicate that if a victim pays voluntarily, the crime is not extortion.
Professor Lindgren dismisses these cases primarily as misstatements of the law influenced by the
incorrect lay impression of extortion. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 884. In Floyd and Cannon's Case,
78 Eng. Rep. 257 (Star Ch. 1628), the court states that "in every oppression there ought to be a
threatning [sic] of the party, for the voluntary payment of a greater sum where a lesser is due cannot
be said extortion." See also The King v. Ayers, 2 Keble 100, 84 Eng. Rep. 63 (1666); Rex v. Burdett,
I Ld. Raym. 148, 91 Eng. Rep. 996 (1696); Lindgren, supra note 2, at 884-85 (citing and discussing
foregoing cases).
65. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text.
66. 91 CONG. REC. 11,906 (1945) (statement of Rep. Robsion).
67. Id. at 11,910 (statement of Rep. Springer); see also id. at 11,914 (statement of Rep. Russell)
(referring to extortion and robbery, "their definition now is a matter of common knowledge") (emphasis added); id. at 11,900 (statement of Rep. Hancock) ("The courts of the States of this country
have tried thousands of cases of robbery and extortion. They know what those crimes are.").
68. Even at times when Congress was silent about whether it was relying on the contemporary
or common-law meaning of a term, the Supreme Court has often rejected the common-law definition. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990) (court applies modern definition of
burglary where there was no evidence that Congress relied on "ancient English law" definition and
where that definition was "ill-suited" to statute's purpose); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 45
(1979) (court applies contemporary definition of bribery where the "common understanding and
meaning of 'bribery' had extended beyond its early common-law definitions"); United States v.
Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1969) (court applies modem definition of extortion where definition
of extortion had expanded in many states beyond the common-law meaning and where common-law
meaning would conflict with Act's purpose); see also Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 362 (1983)
(rejecting common law for modem definition); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 416-17 (1957)
(same). Here, of course, Congress was not silent; it expressly declared its reliance on the contemporary meaning of extortion.
69. See, e.g., Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Perini North River Assoc., 459 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1983); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 406
n.16 (1973); Air Trans. Assoc. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 667 F.2d 316, 321 (2d
Cir. 1981); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948). While it may be a fiction to presume that
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C. The ContemporaneousJudicial Definition of Extortion
What was the prevailing definition of extortion "under color of official right" when Congress passed the Hobbs Act in 1946? From the late
1800s to 1946, numerous courts distinguished official extortion from
bribery by the existence of an element of coercion, duress, or inducement.
The courts did not view the simple passive acceptance of bribes as extortion. A good example is the 1890 decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in State v. Pritchard,70 a case concerning a charge of extortion "under color of office" against a justice of the peace. The court
explained that "[t]he words under 'color of his office' imply that the officer has taken advantage of his position and corruptly used the relation
that he sustains to the government to drive others to submit to his exactions."' 7 1 Further, it stated that the "distinction between bribery and extortion seems to be that the former offense consists in offering a present
or receiving one, the latter in demanding a fee or present by color of
office."

' 72

That same year, in United States v. Harned,73 the District Court of
Washington granted a motion for a directed verdict acquitting a defendant charged with "extortion under color of his office." The court reasoned that the evidence showed only that the defendant had taken a
bribe, not that he had committed extortion. 74 It explained that "[t]he
word 'extortion' implies that the money paid was extorted on the part of
the one who received it, and was paid unwillingly by the party paying the
same .... "75
The California Appellate Court in People v. Powell 76 recognized the
same distinction in 1920 when discussing Section 518 of the California
Code. Similar to the Hobbs Act, Section 518 defined extortion as "the
obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by fear or
force, or under color of official right."' 77 Comparing extortion under this
definition to bribery, the court stated:
[t]hat extortion and bribery are two separate and distinct offenses, we
think, beyond dispute.... Where property is obtained by extortion, the
consent of the person who parts with the property is not free and volCongress is aware of court decisions construing some relevant law, and indeed may even be a farfetched fiction, it is also a long-standing and unquestioned one.
70. 107 N.C. 921, 12 S.E. 50 (1890).
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id. at 52.
73. 43 F. 376 (D. Wash. 1890).
74. Id. at 377.

75. Id.
76. 50 Cal. App. 436, 195 P. 456 (1920).
77. Powell, 195 P. at 458.
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untary, but is, in a measure, coerced, i.e., induced by the wrongful use
of force or fear or under color of official right. Where a bribe is actually received, the property or money given by the briber is not obtained
from him through any coercion of his will. It is given and received
upon agreement or understanding the official conduct of the person
receiving it shall be influenced thereby. From this it follows that a
defendant, if he is guilty of receiving a bribe, cannot as a result of the
same transaction, likewise be guilty of the offense of extortion. 78
The court further distinguished the crimes by noting that extortion "involves an element of coercion by one of the parties" and the victim consequently "cannot be an accomplice," but bribery "necessarily involves a
willing co-operation by both" parties to the transaction. 79
The Ninth Circuit ruled consistently in 1927 in Daniels v. United
States.80 Daniels was convicted of bribing a government prohibition
agent in an attempt to avoid an investigation. 8 1 On appeal, claiming he
was actually the victim of extortion, not a briber, Daniels asserted that
the government agent was guilty of extortion.8 2 Citing Harned and
Pritchard,the court rejected this claim explaining that, unlike bribery,
"[e]xtortion is the taking or obtaining of anything from another by
means of illegal compulsion or oppressive exaction, . . . and the term

implies that the money paid was extorted on the part of the one who
received it, and paid unwillingly by the one who paid it.' ' 83 The court
then noted that "Daniels took the initiative, and was the active proponent of all that was done. All that [the agent] did was to assent ostensi'84
bly to Daniels' offer, and receive the money."
The Supreme Court of Florida recognized essentially the same distinction between extortion and bribery in Callaway v. State8 5 in 1933. In
Callaway, where three criminal statutes proscribed very similar conduct-the unlawful collection of compensation by public officials for the
performance or nonperformance of a duty-the court found that the mis78. Id. (emphasis removed). The court reiterated this view in another portion of the opinion
stating that the crime would constitute bribery if "the money or property is given and received upon
an agreement or understanding that the official conduct of the person receiving it shall be influenced
thereby," but would constitute extortion if it "is obtained through a consent induced by the wrongful
use of force or fear or under color of official right." Id. at 459. Although the distinction drawn by
the court between extortion "under color of official right" and bribery is technically dictum because
the defendant police officer was charged with extortion by fear, the case is important because of the
court's unequivocal interpretation of Section 518--before the adoption of virtually identical language
by Congress when it enacted the Hobbs Act.
79. Id.
80. 17 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 744 (1927).
81. Id. at 340.
82. Id. at 342.
83.

Id.

84. Id.
85. 112 Fla. 599, 152 So. 429 (1933).
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demeanor statute prohibited bribery and the felony statutes prohibited
extortion.8 6 The court explained fully:
[t]he sections denouncing the offense as a felony . . . introduce the

element of extortion which differentiates it from the offense of bribery
and makes it more odious. The offense consists in the oppressive misuse of the exceptional power with which the law invests the incumbent
of an office ....

In the transaction denounced as a misdemeanor the sheriff or deputy is a complaisant tool in the hands of the person offering the reward, a passive agent in the scheme of the bribe giver, but in the
transaction denounced as a felony the officer appears as one exacting a
compensation or reward over that which the law prescribes, from a
person toward whom the officer is required by law or rule to take some
official action; an extortion practiced by demanding the sum required,
or by means of insidious suggestions or veiled threats of the arbitrary
exercise of official power, induces another
to offer a reward for the
87
nonperformance or violation of law.
The decisions in People v. Felds8 and Hornstein v. ParamountPictures, Inc., 9 indicate that the New York Supreme Court also adhered to
this view of extortion at the relevant time. Unlike the cases discussed
above, Feld and Hornstein did not address extortion under color of official right or involve specifically the prosecution of a government official.
But neither case limited its discussion to a particular variety of extortion. 90 In Feld, decided in 1941, the court reversed the conviction of a
86. Id. at 603, 152 So. at 430.
87. Id.
88. 262 A.D. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1941).
89. 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942) aff'd, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740
(1944).
90. Along these lines, the expansionists often point to § 855 of the New York Penal Code,
which, prior to 1909, was entitled "[e]xtortion committed under color of official right." That section
provided that a public officer commits extortion if he "asks, or receives, or agrees to receive, a fee or
other compensation for his official service" in excess of the "fee or compensation" permitted by law
or where no "fee or compensation" is permitted by law. Highlighting the words "receives, or agrees
to receive," expansionists argue that this statute conclusively proves that, under New York law, the
passive receipt of a bribe constituted official extortion. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 897-99; United
States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). This conclusion is not warranted.
The words the expansionists should highlight from § 855 are the words "fee or other compensation for... official service." At a time when public officials often were paid through the collection of
fees for their services, rather than through a salary, many jurisdictions enacted fee statutes similar to
New York. See State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 167 A.2d 161, 166 (1960); Lindgren, supra note 2, at 86675 (discussing fee statutes). Typically, the only crime proscribed by these statutes was the collection
of a fee under the pretense that it was officially due. The crime was called extortion because the
victim's consent is coerced in the sense that the request for a fee is backed by the pretense of the
force of law. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 435-46 (3d Cir. 1979) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Fee statutes did not purport to embrace bribery, which can hardly be described as a "fee or
other compensation for ... official service." See Dunlap v. Curtis, 10 Mass. Rep. 210, 211 (1813)
(referring to Massachusetts' fee statute, extortion by "color of ... office supposes a right to demand
fees of the person who pays them.... But fees demanded of a person not liable, or voluntarily paid
by a person not liable, although improperly and unjustly taken and accepted by the officer, and
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labor union official for extortion of an "employer by threatening to foment a strike among its employees." 9 1 The court found that the union
official was entitled to an instruction, which he did not receive, that "if
the employer were guilty of bribery, the [union official] could not be
guilty of extortion."' 92 The court explained that the "two crimes are mutually exclusive" 93 and that a claim of bribery was a defense to
94
extortion.
A year later in Hornstein, the New York Supreme Court stated that
"the essence of bribery is the voluntary giving of something of value to
influence the performance of official duty" whereas the essence of extortion is coercion or duress of some nature. 95 In support, the court cited 11
C.J.S. Bribery § 1 (1938),96 which states:
[e]xtortion is the unlawful act of an officer in exacting money or property from another under color of official right by the wrongful use of
force or fear; bribery on the other hand, involves a voluntary rather
than coerced payment and may consist of either
97 the offering or receiving of property to influence official conduct.
The New York Court of Appeals decision in People v. Dioguardi,98
although decided after 1946, is instructive for its interpretation of Feld
and Hornstein. Relying solely on those cases, the court held that bribery
and extortion were "mutually exclusive crimes" and that bribery was an
effective defense to a charge of extortion. 99 The court reasoned that bribery "makes the payor equally as guilty as the payee, which could never be
the case with extortion" where the payee is innocent if the payor is
although, in certain cases, he may be punishable for the cheat or fraud, yet this is not extortion, as
the fees, if excessive, are not obtained by color of office."); Runnells v. Fletcher, 15 Mass. 525 (1819)
("it must be proved that the sum, alleged to have been extorted, was demanded as a fee for some
official duty"); State v. Oden, 10 Ind. App. 136, 37 N.E. 731, 732 (1894) (to commit extortion under
Indiana's fee statute, "the sum demanded or received must at least be claimed as due the officer for
services in his official capacity"); Hirshfield v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 18 S.W. 743, 745-46 (1892)
(same interpretation of Texas fee statute); see also Hanley v. State, 125 Wis. 296, 104 N.W. 57, 59
(1905) (discussing distinction between extortion under a fee statute and common-law extortion).
Thus, particularly without support from New York case law, the conclusion that § 855 of the
New York Penal Code embraces bribery is not at all warranted. Indeed, in 1909, well before the
Hobbs Act was passed, the title of § 855 was changed from "[e]xtortion committed under color of
official right" to "[p]ublic officer taking illegal fees commits extortion."
91. Feld, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
must be admitted that the crimes of
92. Id. The dissenting judge agreed, stating that "[i]t
I at 798 (Johnston, J., dissenting).
bribery and extortion are mutually exclusive .... Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 797-98.
95. Hornstein, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 1 (1938) (emphasis added), see also 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1 (1960) (with
respect to extortion under color of official right, "the person paying must have been yielding to
official authority, and not acting voluntarily ....").
98. 8 N.Y.2d 260, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 168 N.E.2d 683 (1960).
99. Id. at 273-74, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82, 168 N.E.2d at 692.
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guilty.I10
The official commentary to the FIELD CODE provides further support for the proposition that official extortion does not fully embrace
bribery. For interpretive guidance, the official comment to the extortion
definition refers to the larceny comment.10 ' Comparing extortion to robbery, the larceny comment contemplates that the consent of an official
extortion victim is coerced or "induced," stating:
[i]n robbery... there is a taking of property from another against his
consent ....

In extortion there is again a taking. Now it is with the

consent of the party injured; but this is a consent induced by threats, or
under color of some official right ....
Thus
extortion partakes in an
02
inferior degree of the nature of robbery.1

Professor W. Burdick, a leading commentator in 1946, held the
same view. Describing official extortion, he explained that "the officer
takes advantage of his official position, and uses it to exact unlawful
gain."' 1 3 He further explained:
[t]o constitute extortion under color of office, all money or things received must have been claimed or accepted in right of office, and the
person paying must have been yielding to official authority. The offense
consists in the oppressive misuse of the power with which the law invests the incumbent of an office ....

tog

100. Id. at 273, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 881, 168 N.E.2d at 692. (emphasis added). Even further support in the case law is provided by cases that appear to recognize the distinction between official
extortion and bribery by implication. In such cases, although the defendant-public officials were not
charged with official extortion, the courts find that the acceptance of a bribe does not constitute
extortion of some other variety. The courts do not suggest that defendants would be guilty of official
extortion. See, e.g., People v. McLaughlin, 2 A.D. 419, 37 N.Y.S. 1005, 1020 ("[A] threat by the
defendant to do a lawful act as captain of the police force, unless money was paid to him, would not
constitute extortion. The failure to perform a legal duty, in consideration of the receipt of money
would be bribery."), rev'd on other grounds, 150 N.Y. 365, 44 N.E. 1017 (1896); State v. Pierce, 76
Iowa 189, 40 N.W. 715 (1888) (constable who accepts bribe is not guilty of extortion); see also State
v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N.W. 330, 336 (1911) ("[t]hat there is a distinction between these
offenses [bribery and extortion] is manifest, and proof of one will not support the other.").
101. FIELD CODE § 613 (official comment).
102. Id. at § 584 (official comment) (latter emphasis added); cf Dive v. Maningham, 1 Plowd.
60, 68, 75 Eng. Rep. 96, 108 (C.B. 1550) (concluding that extortion done colore officii sue is "more
odious than robbery" because it carries the "Mask of Virtue" and is often difficult to prosecute). The
Field Code's comment to the extortion definition also refers to People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1827). This case, however, does not address the present issue. Whaley, a justice of the
peace, entered a money judgment against a civil defendant without the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Pursuant to that judgment, Whaley "received and demanded" payment from the defendant. Whaley
did not give the money to the plaintiff. Id. at 664. Although confirming Whaley's conviction for
extortion under color of office, the court does not determine whether coercion or inducement of
some nature is a required element of the offense. Id. Indeed, Whaley's "demand" for the payment
was backed by the pretense of the force of law, so the matter was not in issue.
103. 1 W. BURDICK, LAW ON CRIME § 275 (1946).
104. Id. at 395 n.91 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Professors Odgers and Odgers
agreed, defining extortion as follows: "[i]f any public officer, in the pretended exercise of the duties of
his office, illegally and from some improper motive takes from any person againsthis will any money
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Consequently, the overwhelming weight of authority in 1946-the
case law, the treatises, the official commentory of the FIELD CODE, and
scholarly commentary--distinguished official extortion from bribery by
the existence an element of coercion, duress, or inducement. It was this
understanding of official extortion that Congress enacted into law
through the Hobbs Act in 1946. Consequently, the Hobbs Act does not
proscribe the passive receipt of bribes.
VI.

THE EXPANSIONISTS' RESPONSE

The strength of the cases and authority cited in the previous section
is highlighted by the expansionists' weak response. Professor Lindgren
states:
[w]hile in the early 1800s the scope of official extortion at common law
was well settled, in the late 1800s the consensus on what had been the
scope of extortion at common law began to break down. Some cases
still stated the law more or less correctly, while other cases began to
misstate the traditional scope of common law extortion.105
But at some point, a growing body of case law cannot be so lightly dismissed as a misstatement of the law. It must be recognized for what it is:
the controlling law. As detailed in the previous section, 0 6 by 1946 many
jurisdictions made substantially the same distinction between official extortion and bribery-an element of coercion, duress, or inducement of
some nature.
Professor Lindgren maintains, however, that the cases from those
jurisdictions are merely a "side channel" of a split in the case law that
occurred in the late 1800s.107 The "main flow of the river," he contends,
is represented by those cases that "still stated the law more or less correctly."' 0 8 He offers very little support for this contention. Indeed, despite exhaustive research reaching back to the 1200s, he cites only two
twentieth century cases.1°9 The Pennsylvania Superior Court decided
both cases near the turn of the century. Admittedly, both cases-Commonwealth v. Wilson," 0 decided in 1906, and Commonwealth v.
or valuable thing which is not then due from that person, he is guilty of extortion." W. L. ODGERS
& W. B. ODGERS, THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 187-88 (1920) (emphasis added).
105. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 886. Most expansionists do not even address the state of the law
after the turn of the century and instead rely solely on arguments about ancient English common
law. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 2, at 14-17; United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158, 1176-90 (9th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
106. See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
107. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 886-87.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 886 n.446.
110. 30 Pa. Super. 26, 30-31 (1906).
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Brown, III decided in 1903-used the English common-law definition of
official extortion, even quoting Blackstone, and recognized that official
extortion was a crime distinct from other kinds of coercive extortion.
Neither court, however, expressly held that a public officer can be convicted of extortion for the passive receipt of a bribe.
In fact, the Wilson court recognized that, to be convicted of extortion, a public official must have taken some affirmative step to induce the
bribe payment. Discussing whether sufficient evidence existed to submit
the case to the jury, the court stated:
[i]t is true, the evidence in the present case does not show that the
defendant made a specific demand for the payment of money, or made
any threat as to what he would do if it was not paid. But the evidence
taken as a connected whole fully warranted the court in submitting to
the jury the questions, whether the defendant's conduct was intended,
and had the effect, to induce [the victim] to believe, and to act on that
belief, that she must give him money, or reward2 him in some way, in
order to obtain the permission she requested.' 1
Professor Lindgren's reliance on Brown and Wilson is particularly
dubious in light of the same court's 1963 decision in Commonwealth v.
Francis.1 3 The court in Francisexplicitly relied upon Brown and Wilson,
among other cases, to hold that inducement was an element of official
extortion. The court stated:
[w]e have held many times that the extraction of money or other things
of value under a threat of using the power of one's office may constitute extortion. Such provision of the statute is the same as it is under
the common law crime. However, in all of these cases, as well as many
others examined by us, when there has been extortion of money by
"color of office" there has always been some threat, veiled or expressed, incident to it. We must therefore conclude that under the
statutory definition of extortion, when the offence is "by color of his
111. 23 Pa. Super. 470, 490-91 (1903).
112. Wilson, 30 Pa. Super. at 29-30. The precise jury instruction that the court affirmed was
even more clear on this point:
[t]hat where a person desiring to commit an illegal act or enter into an unlawful business
voluntarily offers a police officer a sum of money to be permitted to do an illegal act or
enter into such illegal business, even if the officer accepts such sum of money, his offense in
such case is not extortion; and if the jury believed the facts to be as stated in this point,
defendant cannot be convicted.... This is true if the facts are just as stated in this point.
But if the offer of money is not voluntary, but is induced by the fact that the person is given
to understand that money or something of value must be given to secure the noninterference of the defendant, the case is entirely different and you may find extortion. There is no
evidence here that this man demanded in terms money from this woman. But if you find
that his conduct meant that-that he gave her to understand that-that she must give him
money or in some way do a favor to him before he would assent to her request, then you
may find him guilty as indicted.
Id. at 27.
113. 201 Pa. Super. 313, 191 A.2d 884 (1963).
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office", some threat to perform the duty of or to exercise the rights or
power of that office must be established.
Although we have recognized that the crimes of common law extortion and bribery may coincide at times, . .. it is generally held that
they are mutually exclusive crimes.' 14
Many other official extortion cases from 1900 to 1946 suffered from
the same infirmity as Brown and Wilson. They did not squarely confront
the issue at hand. While some of the cases contained inconclusive dictum, none decided whether a showing of coercion, duress, or inducement
is an element of official extortion. 1 5 Without any discussion of this issue,
these cases certainly were not "the main flow of the river." Instead, the
numerous cases cited in the previous section that directly confronted and
resolved the issue in fact represented the "main flow of the river" in
1946.1 16 Thus, consistent with these cases recognizing that official extortion does not fully embrace bribery, and as with all other varieties of
extortion, a showing of some form of coercion, duress or inducement is
necessary to prove official extortion under the Hobbs Act.
This is not to say, however, that no distinction exists between extortion induced "under color of official right" and extortion induced by the
use of "force, violence or fear." A public official occupies a unique position of power, and often has the discretion to wield that power over
others. Similar to "force, violence or fear," officials can use the power
that comes with public office to coerce or induce a person to part with
money or property. This inducement may take many forms, but in all
cases, the courts must focus on the actions and intent of the public official. The official must affirmatively take some step to induce the payor to
part with the money or property. The passive receipt of a corrupt payment voluntarily offered by the payor is not extortion.
VII.

MCNALLY AND THE RULE OF LENITY

117
The question facing the Supreme Court in United States v. Evans
regarding the jurisdictional reach of the Hobbs Act is very similar to the

114. Id. at 322-23, 191 A.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., State v. Barts, 132 N.J.L. 74, 38 A.2d 838, aff'd, 132 N.J. 420, 40 A.2d 639 (1944)
(police officer threatens to arrest and jail victim if payment is not made), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 341 A.2d 598 (1975); La Tour v. Stone, 139 Fla. 681, 190 So. 704, 709
(1939) (quoted formulation of official extortion, indicates demand necessary) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 3 Bush 25, 96 Am. Dec. 192, 193-94 (1867)); Cox v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 436,
244 P. 206 (1926) (defendant threatens victim with prosecution); Hanley v. State, 125 Wis. 396, 104
N.W. 57, 79 (1905) (court's formulation of official extortion, indicates demand is necessary).
116. See supra notes 70-100 and accompanying text.
117. 910 F.2d 790 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
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question it faced in 1987 in McNally v. United States,"t8 which dealt with
the jurisdictional reach of the mail fraud statute. Since the early 1970s,
the Government had used the mail fraud statute in the Seventh Circuit
and elsewhere to prosecute public officials for depriving citizens of their
right to honest and faithful services.' 19 In relevant part, that statute prohibits the use of the United States mails for the purposes of executing
"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for any obtaining of money or
property by means of false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises .... ,,120 The Court addressed the question of whether that
statute prohibited schemes to deprive "individuals, the people, or the
government of intangible rights, such as the right to have public officials
2
perform their duties honestly."' '
Every Court of Appeals addressing the issue prior to 1987 held that
the mail fraud statute did in fact protect "intangible rights."' 122 Even the
Supreme Court recognized that "[b]ecause the two phrases identifying
the proscribed schemes appear in the disjunctive, it is arguable that they
are to be construed independently and that the money-or-property requirement of the later phrase does not limit schemes to defraud to those
aimed as causing deprivation of money or property."' 23 Nevertheless,
the Court held that the statute must be interpreted strictly, prohibiting
only schemes aimed at depriving money or property. In language that
may be repeated in Evans, the McNally Court stated:
[t]he Court has often stated that when there are two rational readings
of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the
harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.
As the Court said in a mail fraud case years ago: "[t]here are no constructive offenses; and before one can be punished, it must be shown
that his case is plainly within the statute." Rather than construe the
statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and
involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited
in scope to the protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go
118. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
119. Like the Third Circuit was to the Hobbs Act in United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972) (see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text), the Seventh
Circuit was instrumental in expanding the jurisdictional reach of the mail fraud statute through the
development of the "intangible rights" rationale. See United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646-48
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1975); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 546-50 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149-50 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1974).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
121. McNally, 483 U.S. at 358.
122. See id.

123. Id.

LIMITING HOBBS ACT PROSECUTIONS

further, it must speak more clearly than it
VIII.

has.

12 4

CONCLUSION

If any doubt remains that the prevailing view of extortion "under
color of official right" in 1946 mandates a stricter reading of the Hobbs
Act than advocated by the Seventh Circuit, McNally and the timehonored Rule of Lenity should settle the matter conclusively. Because
Congress did not proscribe the passive receipt of bribes in "clear and
definitive language" when it drafted the Hobbs Act, the Supreme Court
should choose the less harsh reading of the Act. Thus, the Court should
construe the Act as follows: "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced ... under color of official right." The Court

should hold that a showing of inducement is a requirement in all Hobbs
Act prosecutions, and that extortion under color of official right does not
fully embrace bribery.
This does not mean that the Government necessarily should be precluded from prosecuting the passive receipt of bribes by state and local
officials. It should do so, however, only under a statute that clearly authorizes such prosecutions upon a proper jurisdictional basis. After McNally, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which expressly authorizes
prosecutions that McNally found beyond the jurisdictional reach of the
mail fraud statute. The newly added § 1346 provides, "the term 'scheme
or artifice to defraud' [in the mail fraud statute] includes a scheme or
1 25
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."
Assuming a jurisdictional basis exists, Congress could act similarly regarding extortion by passing a statute outlawing the passive acceptance
of bribes by state and local officials. Currently, no such statute exists.
124. Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted). In United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), the Court
also emphasized the need for a clear congressional statement before a criminal statute would be
construed to expand federal jurisdiction into a matter traditionally left to the states:
[u]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly
changed the federal-state balance. Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a
federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States. This congressional
policy is rooted in the same concepts of American federalism that have provided the basis
for judge-made doctrines. As this Court emphasized only last term in Rewis v. United
States, [401 U.S. 808 (1971)], we will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to
effect a significant change in the sensitive relations between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the
requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to
bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.
Id. at 347.
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
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POSTSCRIPT

After this article was written, the Supreme Court decided Evans,
affirming the defendant's Hobbs Act conviction by a vote of 6 to 3.126
Thus, the answer to the question posed by the article's title is "no;" Evans will not be the next McNally. Somewhat disturbingly, the majority
never discussed McNally and the Rule of Lenity in reaching its result.
Moreover, as the dissent points out, 1 27 the majority mistakenly relied on

English common law to define extortion under color of official right,
rather than American common law at the time the Hobbs Act was
enacted.
Given the widespread criticism of the expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction and the Court's recent trend toward limiting that expansion,
it is difficult to comprehend why the Court failed to adopt a stricter reading of the Hobbs Act and its legislative history. While policy reasons
may support federal prosecution of local public corruption, even stronger
policy reasons support adherence to the Rule of Lenity and the interests
it promotes.
Justice Thomas' dissent, which discusses American official extortion
cases contemporaneous to the Hobbs Act's enactment and undertakes a
Rule of Lenity analysis, provides a better reasoned approach to the issue
addressed in Evans. 28 Unfortunately, it is only a dissent.

126. Evans v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W 4411, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3122 (May 26, 1992) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, U.S. file).
127. Evans, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3122, at *38 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at *51 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

